




There has been a recent surge of interest among economists in develop-
ing models of doxastic states that can account for some aspects of human
cognitive limitations that are ignored by standard formal models, such as
awareness. Epistemologists purport to have a principled reason for ignor-
ing the question of awareness: under the equilibrium conception of doxastic
states they favour, a doxastic state comprises the doxastic commitments an
agent would recognise were he fully aware, so the question of awareness
plays no role. The objective of this paper is to scrutinize this argument. A
thesis underlying the argument, which we call the independence of doxas-
tic commitments with respect to awareness, is identiﬁed, and examples are
given where it appears to be violated. By considering these examples, one
can get an idea of the price of accepting this thesis. On the one hand, one
can escape the conclusion that the thesis is violated, but only at the expense
of another principle espoused by all major formal models of belief, which
we call constant doxastic rest; and abandoning this principle necessitates
extensive revision of current models of belief. On the other hand, there are
epistemologically valid reasons for thinking that the thesis fails to hold in
the examples, which have to be rebutted if the thesis, and the equilibrium
justiﬁcation for ignoring the issue of awareness, are to be retained.
Keywords Bounded rationality; awareness; doxastic states; cognitive equilib-
rium; belief change; formal epistemology.
The main formal models of states of belief, or doxastic states, which have
been proposed and used by epistemologists, as well the classic models of doxastic
states employed by economists, share a central assumption. Whether one repre-
sents doxastic states by consistent sets of sentences closed under logical conse-
quence, or equivalently, sets of possible worlds (Hintikka, 1962; Aumann, 1976;
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Stalnaker, 1984; Gärdenfors, 1988), by probability measures or sets of probabil-
ity measures (Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1954; Jeffrey, 1972), or by combinations
of sets of sentences and sets of probability measures (Levi, 1980), to take but a
few important examples, one assumes that an agent’s doxastic state at a particu-
lar moment can be represented by a (logically or probabilistically) well-behaved
“structure” on the set of sentences of a given language.1
Of course, such an assumption has long been identiﬁed as problematic, if the
purpose of these models is to describe the actual states of belief of agents in a
“non-idealised” way. In particular, it implies that these models cannot take into
account the agent’s state of awareness (Dekel et al., 1998). However, the fact that
an agent is aware or unaware of particular issues does seem to play a signiﬁcant
role in his decision-making, and that of others. Accordingly, there have been
several recent efforts, particularly among economists conscious of the potential
importance of the notion of awareness in strategic situations, to develop models
which can capture awareness, and its consequences for behaviour (Heifetz et al.,
2006; Halpern and Rêgo, 2007).
To date, epistemologists have not been impressed with such alleged problems
with the models they use, and have made little effort to incorporate awareness into
their models. A major reason for this is the particular conception many of them
have of what their models are intended to represent: not the agent’s “raw” beliefs,
if there is such a thing, but the beliefs the agent would have were he allowed to
come to a state of cognitive equilibrium. In any such equilibrium, the agent is
fully aware; by considering only such equilibria, the epistemologist can ignore
the question of awareness.
The objective of this paper is to scrutinize more closely this defence of the
standard formal models used in epistemology, with an eye to assessing the price
of ignoring the issue of awareness. We ﬁrst identify an assumption underlying
the equilibrium argument for these models, namely the thesis of independence of
doxastic commitments with respect to awareness (Section 1). In Section 2, we
consider examples which are prima facie violations of this thesis. These exam-
ples do not prove that the thesis of independence of doxastic commitments with
respect to awareness is false, for one can ﬁnd analyses which do not require it to
be violated. However, such analyses violate another principle, which is shared
by virtually all current models of doxastic states, that we call constant doxastic
rest. In Section 3, we consider some unwelcome consequences of rejecting con-
stant doxastic rest: they emphasise that the equilibrium conception of doxastic
states does not come for “free”, but may require some important modiﬁcations
in current models and theories of belief. In Section 4, we consider arguments
1For the purposes of this paper, we can set aside the question of the nature of the objects of
belief, and assume them to be sentences.
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for rejecting the thesis of independence of doxastic commitments with respect to
awareness; these arguments suggest that, contrary to the generally accepted view,
incorporation of awareness into models of belief may be justiﬁed on epistemolog-
ical grounds.
1 Cognitive Equilibrium and Awareness Change
It is well-known that the main formal models of belief used by economists and
epistemologists do not do justice to human cognitive limitations. These models
represent doxastic states as consistent, and such that all (logical or probabilistic)
consequences of beliefs are drawn; ordinary human beings just do not seem to
live up to these standards of consistency and completeness. As mentioned above,
among philosophers, proponents of the models explicitly claim that they have a
principled reason for ignoring such problems. A clear and eloquent defence of
this claim, which is representative of the consensus in the ﬁeld, is provided by
Isaac Levi.2
I suggest that we distinguish between the standard for serious pos-
sibility to which X is committed at time t and X’s awareness at t of
the standard to which he is committed; or equivalently of the corpus
to which he is committed. ...
Thus, changes in X’s awareness of his commitments at t ought to
be distinguished from changes in X’s commitments. The former sort
of change may be compared to a shift towards an equilibrium. The
more fully aware X is of his commitments, the closer he is to a state
of cognitive equilibrium. On this analogy, X is committed at t to a
state of cognitive equilibrium whether he has actually attained it or
not. The features of rational equilibrium I have been discussing have
been introduced by an appeal to those functions which X’s corpus of
knowledge ought ideally to perform.
The account of the revision of knowledge ...I am aiming to con-
struct here prescribes shifts from one state of cognitive equilibrium
to another without prescribing details of the psychological or social
changes which are made in implementing the revision. (Levi, 1980,
pp10-11)
2See Levi (1991, Ch 2), Gärdenfors (1988, §1.2) and Bradley (2007, §4.1), to mention but
several examples, for other formulations of similar positions, albeit in slightly different terms.
Although there are subtle differences among the notions of cognitive equilibrium proposed in the
literature, the general points extracted below are common to all, so the arguments proposed in this
paper, although they are couched in the terms used by Levi (1980), apply irrespective of the notion
of cognitive equilibrium adopted.
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Epistemologists who propose and use the sorts of formal models mentioned
above are interested in the beliefs the agent is committed to – his doxastic com-
mitments – rather than those he recognises himself as having: those he would
acknowledge were he fully aware, rather than those he does identify in his state
of partial awareness. As is clear from the quote, this delimitation is supposed to
allow one to ignore the problem of human cognitive limitations. One can continue
to model doxastic states as fully consistent and closed under consequence since
the doxastic states of interest to epistemologists are merely “idealised” cognitive
equilibria. Moreover, the question of change need only be considered in terms of
such ideal states, for only the move from one cognitive equilibrium – or closed
and consistent set of doxastic commitments – to another is of interest. Under this
equilibrium conception of the study of beliefs and belief change, awareness is an
epiphenomenon, and as such can be ignored.
This conception tacitly rests on what may be called the thesis of the indepen-
dence of doxastic commitments with respect to awareness (IDCA):
(IDCA) Changes in awareness alone do not affect the agent’s doxastic commit-
ments.
Suppose that at moment t John is doxastically committed to sentence X. Ac-
cording to these models, the belief that X is in his doxastic state at t; the doxastic
commitment to X is in the cognitive equilibrium that is associated with him at t
(and that he would be in were he fully aware). Suppose however that at t he is not
aware of this commitment, because he is not aware of the issues involved (he is
not aware of the sentence X itself). One step in the ‘shift towards an equilibrium’
described by Levi is becoming aware of X. However, if, on merely becoming
aware of the issue, John changes his beliefs – and his doxastic commitments –
and ceases to believe that X, then the cognitive equilibrium associated with him
– his doxastic state, as modelled by the theories mentioned above – changes. If
such changes in belief can occur rationally, the equilibrium conception is severely
weakened.
First of all, the contention that there is an equilibrium is thrown into doubt.
A change in awareness is supposed to be a shift towards equilibrium, but a shift
towards equilibrium should not change the equilibrium towards which one is shift-
ing: if it does, one may justiﬁably wonder whether one will ever reach an equi-
librium at all. One might reply by reﬁning the concept of cognitive equilibrium
so that, by deﬁnition, it consists of the doxastic commitments the agent would
have on becoming aware of all sentences, whether or not these include his current
doxastic commitments. But then the possibility of changes in doxastic commit-
ments on mere change of awareness threatens the consistency of this deﬁnition.
If such changes are possible, then there is a risk that the order in which one be-
comes aware may affect the doxastic commitments one holds when one attains
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full awareness. Of course, if the order of awareness change has such effects, this
notion of cognitive equilibrium is not well-deﬁned: there may be no unique set of
doxastic commitments which the agent would have were he fully aware, for such
a set would depend on the details of how he attained this awareness.
Secondly, even supposing that the notion of cognitive equilibrium can be con-
sistently deﬁned and is non-empty, the possibility of change in doxastic commit-
ments on mere change in awareness undermines the interest of this notion for the
study of doxastic attitudes. For one, if doxastic commitments may change on
awareness change, the cognitive equilibrium at which one arrives risks lacking
any comprehensible relation with the non-idealised “state of belief and aware-
ness” from which one began. More importantly, if the agent’s cognitive equilib-
rium may change on changes of awareness, then, contrary to what Levi suggests,
invoking equilibria does not allow one to ignore the problem of human cognitive
limitations. In constructing an account of the revision of belief or knowledge (un-
derstood in terms of cognitive equilibria), one would have to take into account the
issue of awareness and awareness change. So, in the absence of stability of dox-
astic commitments in the face of awareness change, not only does the cognitive
equilibrium risk being an abstract object with no recognisable relation to “real”
belief states, but it fails to fulﬁl the role for which it was introduced: justifying
ignoring the question of awareness. The equilibrium conception of doxastic states
and the changes they undergo requires that such states are unaffected by changes
in awareness; it requires IDCA.
The changes of awareness at issue here are changes of awareness alone. In
natural language, one sometimes speaks of ‘becoming aware’ of something when
talking of cases where one just turns one attention to it or gains cognizance of it
(as in ‘he became aware of a certain argument against his position’); one also uses
the phrase for cases where one focusses on a subject and simultaneously obtains
(propositional) knowledge concerning it (as in ‘he become aware that the funds
had run out’).3 The former cases can be thought of as pure changes in awareness,
whereas the latter cases are compound changes: typically, they involve a change of
awarenesswiththeadditionofsomenewinformation(formoreonthisdistinction,
see Hill (2010)). Of course, the latter cases pose no threat to the formal models
discussed here. Plenty of accounts have been proposed of changes of doxastic
states in the face of new information, and they can be applied to such compound
changes in awareness. The fact that John’s beliefs (and doxastic commitments)
regarding the ozone layer change when he becomes aware that there is a huge
3Correspondingly, the phrase ‘being aware’ is sometimes used to refer to what the agent has
“in mind”, what he pays attention to or is cognizant of (he is aware of the problem and is trying to
solve it), but it sometimes also carries an implication of knowledge or belief of that of which the
agent is aware (he is aware that he is late). Throughout this paper, the term ‘awareness’ is only
used in the former sense; no connotation of knowledge or belief is intended.
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hole in it can be accounted for by the aforementioned models by noting that John
not only pays attention to a subject of which he was not previously conscious, but
he has also received new information concerning it: the models treat the change
as resulting from the incorporation of the new information, ignoring the change
in attention (the “pure” awareness component). By contrast, the standard models
do not and cannot deal with pure changes of awareness, such as the change which
occurs when John becomes aware of the issue of whether there is a hole in the
ozone layer, without being told whether there is one or not. For good reason: as
noted above, these models assume that awareness is of no importance for doxastic
commitments.
In order to evaluate the tenability of the equilibrium conception dismissal of
the question of awareness, we shall attempt to assess the “cost” of accepting the
thesis of independence of doxastic commitments with respect to awareness, which
underliesit. Giventheﬂexibilityinapplicationsofthetraditionalmodels, itisvery
unlikely that there exists a indubitable proof of the falsity of this thesis: for any
apparent counterexample to IDCA, one can probably ﬁnd some analysis accord-
ing to which the thesis is not violated. However, such analyses may have some
unappealing consequences, and these consequences give a measure of the “direct
costs” of holding on to IDCA. Moreover, there may sometimes be good reasons
in favour of violating IDCA; since these will have to be rebutted by anyone in-
tent on defending the thesis, they give a measure of the “opportunity costs” of
holding onto IDCA. In the following sections, by considering several examples
of awareness change which appear to violate IDCA, we identify some direct and
opportunity costs of holding onto the thesis.
2 Three Examples of Awareness Change
Consider the following examples.
1. Jim is an air-trafﬁc controller. Ten minutes ago, sitting in front of his screen,
he told ground control that ﬂight AA564 was at coordinates X; he believed
that AA564 was at X. Since that moment he has not paid any attention to
that ﬂight. Now he has to go to the toilet, where he is reminded of the ﬂight
by a colleague, who does not know where it is. On being reminded of the
ﬂight, his belief has changed: he no longer believes that it is at coordinates
X, and vows to check where it is as soon as he gets back to his post.
2. Tom is a doctor. Two years ago, he was the regional specialist in a particu-
lar illness: he had read all the literature on the latest cures and medication
for that disease. Then he changed hospital and has not seen a patient with
this problem since. He has not read one article on the subject, nor given
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any serious thought to it, in the intervening period. One day, a patient with
the condition arrives in his ward: although Tom remembers that two years
prior he believed the drug Z to have good chances of curing the disease,
he no longer holds this belief with enough conviction to prescribe the drug,
preferring to refer the patient to a doctor who is more up to speed on the
disease. His beliefs have changed, though he has not learnt any new infor-
mation.
3. Rich is a scientist specialising in global warming. In 2008, he made precise
predictions about how big the hole in the ozone layer would be at the end of
December 2009, though he has not given much attention to this issue since.
In January 2010, he is reminded of the issue of the hole in the ozone layer,
and asked how big it is. Though he remembers his prediction, he decides
to suspend judgement on the issue: after all, there is a research group who
will soon have, or already do have, the precise measurements.
These examples have a common structure. At an initial stage, the agent in
question has certain beliefs, or doxastic commitments, about a particular issue. It
is not unreasonable to say that his state of cognitive equilibrium at that moment
contains such commitments (respectively: that AA546 was at X; that drug Z has
good chances of curing the disease; that the size of the ozone hole in December
2009 is W square kilometres). In an intervening period, the agent does not con-
sider the issue. There thus seems to be little reason to think that his beliefs, or
his doxastic commitments, would change. Finally, at the end of the period, his
attention is drawn to the subject: in all cases, just on becoming aware of the is-
sue, the agent changes his beliefs, and what he is doxastically committed to. In
all cases, there is apparently nothing irrational about these changes of belief. So
these appear to be cases where the agents’ doxastic commitments have changed,
just because of a change in awareness. Prima facie, they are cases where IDCA is
violated.
As discussed above, this conclusion is troublesome for traditional models of
doxastic states. Were one to want to defend these models, one would have to
reject this preliminary analysis of the examples. Two strategies are available. On
the one hand, one could argue that beliefs do indeed change when the person in
question becomes aware of the issue, but that these are not cases of pure awareness
change: there is rather some new information which is learnt and which explains
the change in beliefs. On the other hand, one could argue that there is no change
in beliefs when the agents become aware of the respective issues, because the
beliefs had already changed before the moment in question. Let us consider these
7Brian Hill Awareness and Equilibrium
strategies.4
The ﬁrst strategy suggests that, in all the cases, the agent learns some new
information when he becomes aware of the respective issue (the position of the
ﬂight, the drug to use in such circumstances, the size of the hole in the ozone
layer). It is difﬁcult to see what this could be: none of the agents appear to re-
ceive any new information from the outside world, perception or testimony. One
suggestion is that the agent learns that he has not received any information in the
intervening period; for example, Tom learns that he has not kept up to speed with
the literature in that period. However, this cannot be correct, for suppose that Tom
learns at time t that he will not keep up with the literature in the next two years.
Would this mean that, updating on this information, he should relinquish his be-
lief that the drug has good chances of cure already, at time t?5 Another suggestion
would be that they learn what time it is at the moment that they become aware
of the issue, and that this “new information” triggers the changes in belief. This
suggestion is easily dispensed with. It can be assumed that the agents know the
4We omit explicit discussion of replies which seek to challenge the fact that there has been
a change in belief at all, because they are either speciﬁc to a particular notion of belief, or they
lead to strategies which fall into one of the two categories mentioned in the text. For example,
one might doubt that there is any change in full belief in the examples; however, it is difﬁcult to
deny that there is a change in the agents’ degrees of belief or conﬁdence in their beliefs, and this
is sufﬁcient for our purposes. Indeed, unless indicated, the discussion in this paper holds for all
standard notions of belief (so, although at times the language of full belief may be used, this is
entirely for expositionary ease). Alternatively, one might reply to the example by insisting that the
“norms for belief” have changed rather than the “beliefs themselves”. However, the main interest
of this paper is epistemological, and the epistemologist is interested in whatever sense of the term
‘belief’ there is which satisﬁes the appropriate norms. This reply does nothing to alleviate the
need to explain the change in beliefs in these examples, where ‘belief’ is understood in this sense.
Presumably, someone who proposes this sort of reply would wish to defend a modiﬁcation of
standard models of doxastic states which is as radical, if not more radical, than those considered
in Sections 3 and 4 below: namely replacing the single notion of belief present in these models
with two notions – a “psychological” notion of belief and a notion of doxastic norm – which are
considered, and modelled, separately and which combine according to some rule to produce the
notionof(“norm-worthy”)beliefthatisthestandardsubjectofepistemology. Onlybysuchamove
can one make sense of the reply mentioned above, via the idea is that the “psychological belief”
remains ﬁxed in these examples, whereas the doxastic norm changes. Full discussion of such a
move must await a more developed theory along these lines. Let us simply note that, as concerns
the change in the “norm-worthy” beliefs, only two options remain if IDCA is to be preserved:
either the effect of the norm change on the set of “norm-worthy” beliefs occurs at the moment of
awareness change or it has already occurred before the moment when the agent becomes aware of
the issue. These correspond to the two strategies discussed in the main text.
5This sort of argument can be used to reject any suggestion where what is learnt could be
learnt before the moment of the awareness change; such suggestions include proposals about norm
changes mentioned in footnote 4. Moreover, taken in tandem with the point made below concern-
ing learning the time, it shows that whatever change is occurring is not a standard case of update;
see also Section 3.
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time before being made aware of the issue in question, so it does not count as new
information. To put the same point more fastidiously, consider modiﬁed versions
of the examples where the agent in question is told the time just before being
made aware of the issue. Either their doxastic commitments change on learning
the time, in which case they had already changed before the agent became aware
of the issue, and this case is an example of the second strategy for defending
IDCA, which will be considered below; or the doxastic commitments in question
do not change on learning the time, but rather on being made aware of the issues,
in which case the time cannot be the “new information” which explains the belief
change. In summary, it is difﬁcult to see how this ﬁrst prospective defence of
IDCA could get off the ground.
That leaves the second strategy, according to which the change in awareness
does not induce a change in doxastic commitments because the commitments had
already changed before the moment when the agent became aware of the issue.
All the examples involve beliefs which seem to have a natural, in-built “clock”:
the idea would be that one’s doxastic commitments change “automatically” as
time passes.
This is certainly a coherent way of escaping the conclusion that IDCA is vio-
lated; the problem with it is the price to be paid. Such an analysis of the examples
sanctions violation of a property shared by all major formal models of belief and
belief change, which we call constant doxastic rest.
Toexplainthepoint, considerexample1. There, thebeliefconcernsasentence
(‘AA546 is at position X’) whose truth value changes in time. One can avoid
the suggestion that a change in awareness alone induces a change in belief by
explicitly time-indexing the sentences of the relevant language. At the initial time
t, Jim both believed that AA546 is at position X at t and that AA546 is not at
position X at t + 10. Neither of these beliefs have changed; so the change in
awareness has no effect. This is an example of the strategy of proposing that
the doxastic commitments (to the sentence ‘AA546 is currently at position X’, in
this case) change “automatically” because the object of the doxastic commitment
(the sentence) has different content at different moments (due to the indexical
‘currently’) and doxastic commitments to the time-independent contents do not
change.
However, this treatment will not work for the other examples. In example 2.,
it is not the object of the belief (the sentence believed) which is time sensitive
but something about the belief itself. The drug in question is as likely to cure
the patient now as it was two years ago, so one cannot analyse this example by
saying that, two years ago (time t), Tom was doxastically committed to ‘drug Z
has good chances of curing the patient at time t’, but not to ‘drug Z has good
chances of curing the patient at time t + 2’. Rather, what is needed is that Tom
is doxastically committed, at time t, to drug Z having good chances of curing the
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disease, whilst not begin doxastically committed, at t+2, to the drug having good
chances of cure, in the absence of any information or “trigger” relevant to this
issue in the intervening time. Hence, in order to defend the position that Tom’s
doxastic commitments had already changed before he became aware of the new
case, one must give up the following thesis about belief change:
(Constant doxastic rest) In the absence of perturbation of an agent’s doxastic
commitment with respect to a sentence, his doxastic commitment remains
constant.
This principle basically states that belief changes can only occur by perturba-
tions to the doxastic state; the doxastic state of rest, so to speak, is that of constant
belief. Of course, the principle as stated is not fully precise, since the notion of
‘perturbation’ of a doxastic commitment remains to be spelled out in more detail.
However, it sufﬁces for the purposes of this paper to understand by ‘perturbation’
any deliberate sort of belief change which has been proposed and studied in the
literature to date – incorporation of new information considered to be relevant to
the sentence in question, moments of inductive inference, suspension of belief on
discovery of an anomaly or on the proposal of a competing hypothesis, and so on.
(We return to the question of possible perturbations in Section 4.) Understood so,
this principle is satisﬁed, implicitly or explicitly, by all major formal theories of
belief and belief change proposed to date. In fact, it is a direct consequence, if not
an expression, of the Peircian perspective according to which it is belief change,
rather than beliefs themselves, which are to be justiﬁed. Since such justiﬁcation
must pass by the receipt of new information or some external signal, or by a de-
liberate act of (non-deductive) inference of some sort, it is tacitly assumed that, in
the absence of these, beliefs remain constant.
If example 2. is analysed as implying a change in doxastic commitment be-
tween the initial moment and the moment when Tom is reminded of the disease,
then this example violates the principle of constant doxastic rest. For in this ex-
ample, there is no perturbation concerning the belief about the drug of any sort
proposed to date between the two time points, so the doxastic state is at rest; how-
ever, the belief has changed, so it is not constant.
Example 3. hammers home the point. In this case, the beliefs at both times
concern an issue related to the same moment – the size of the hole in the ozone
layer in December 2009 – so one cannot distinguish two time-indexed sentences
referring to different moments of time to which Rich has always had different
doxastic commitments (as in example 1.). Hence, were one intent on insisting that
Rich’s doxastic commitments changed before he was made aware of the issue, one
would have to accept that these commitments have changed in the absence of any
of the sorts of trigger or deliberate belief change considered to date; one would
have to accept that his state of doxastic rest is non constant.
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In summary, the thesis of independence of doxastic commitments with respect
to awareness can be saved from the threat posed by examples 2. and 3., but at
the price of surrendering the principle of constant doxastic rest, which, as noted
above, is espoused by all major current models of belief and belief change. But
how could an agent’s doxastic commitments change in the absence of any per-
turbing inﬂuence? Alternatively, why would doxastic commitments change on
merely becoming aware of an issue? In the following sections, we examine the
two horns of the dilemma posed by these examples. First of all, we examine
the “cost” of retaining IDCA, by considering the consequences of giving up the
principle of constant doxastic rest, and in particular the philosophical and tech-
nical modiﬁcations that would be required in current models of doxastic states to
deal with examples such as those given above. Then we consider the “beneﬁts”
of abandoning IDCA – or, if you will, the “opportunity costs” of retaining it –
by proposing a possible rationale for why changes in doxastic commitments may
occur on changes of awareness alone.
3 Forgoing Constant Doxastic Rest
In order to retain IDCA, and thus the equilibrium conception of doxastic states,
one must abnegate the principle that the only changes in doxastic states occur in
the presence of some perturbing inﬂuence. In this section, we consider the cost of
abandoning this principle, in terms of the modiﬁcations required to current models
of belief. First of all, we give an argument that violations of constant doxastic rest
may be incompatible with models of full belief. It is a surprising, and certainly
unwelcome consequence that, if one were intent on holding onto the equilibrium
conception, one may be forced to abandon the notion of full belief. Then, in
order to gauge what sorts of modiﬁcations in current models of belief are required
to account for cases where the principle is violated, we consider a natural story
which explains how it could be that, in cases such as these, an agent’s doxastic
commitments change in the absence of any perturbation.
Suppose that you have a model of doxastic states including a notion of full
belief, and suppose moreover that you have given up the principle of constant
doxastic rest. It nevertheless seems reasonable to retain the following weaker
principle:
(Doxastic continuity) If an agent is doxastically committed to sentence A at t,
in the absence of perturbation to this doxastic commitment between t and
t + 1 second, then he is doxastically committed to A at t + 1 second.
Whereas constant doxastic rest concerns all species of doxastic commitments,
doxastic continuity only involves doxastic commitments corresponding to full be-
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liefs.6 And whereas constant doxastic rest concerns any period of time, doxastic
continuity concerns only small periods. As such, it seems reasonable, even in the
face of rationalisations of non-constant doxastic rest such as those considered be-
low. Even if one admits that beliefs may change in the absence of perturbation,
why should Tom’s belief that the drug has good chances of cure change from one
second to the next (in the absence of perturbation)?
However, by a sorites style argument, doxastic continuity implies constant
doxastic rest, for full beliefs. Suppose that an agent is doxastically committed to
A at t, and there is no perturbation to this belief between t and t + 2 years. Then
the agent is doxastically committed to A at t + 1 second, by doxastic continuity.
Therefore he is doxastically committed to A at t + 2 seconds, by doxastic conti-
nuity. And so on, until t + 2 years  1 second, whence, by doxastic continuity,
the agent is doxastically committed to A at t + 2 years. So constant doxastic rest
holds for the full belief that A.
If there is a notion of full belief in one’s model of doxastic states, doxastic
continuity (applied to the full belief) implies constant doxastic rest. The bullet
which a defender of the equilibrium model of belief must bite becomes ever less
appetising: not only must he relinquish the principle of constant doxastic rest,
but in order to do so he must either agree to banish full belief from his model of
doxastic states, or he must somehow argue that the full-belief short-term instance
of constant doxastic rest – doxastic continuity – is also to be rejected. If violations
of constant doxastic rest seem difﬁcult to justify, it becomes almost impossible to
imagine how one might defend violations of doxastic continuity. Of course, many
will already have doubts about the notion of full belief, but it should nevertheless
strike one as strange that they end up being banished because of considerations
pertaining to the consistency of the equilibrium conception itself.
Of course, sorites arguments of the sort employed here have received intensive
study, especially in recent years, and this is not the place for an in-depth consid-
eration of all the possible replies to an argument of this sort. All the more so
that, as the literature on the sorites teaches us, any rejection of the argument will
require one to accept some prima facie unintuitive position, and the whole pur-
pose of mentioning it here is to emphasise how uncomfortable it may be to reject
constant doxastic rest. So let us content ourself with one remark about a moral
to be drawn from an argument of this sort. For those who are willing to give up
constant doxastic rest for full beliefs, the argument above emphasises that fact
that there must be a moment when the full beliefs change without there being any
6In the formulation of the principle, we are thus following the convention that, in the absence
of a qualiﬁcation indicating the degree of the belief (or of the doxastic commitment), one is talking
about full belief. A version of doxastic continuity can be formulated for other species of doxastic
commitments, and in particular for partial beliefs, but, as shall be clear in a moment, it is of at
most tangential interest here.
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perturbing inﬂuence (this is the moment when doxastic continuity is violated). A
difﬁculty for defenders of this position is to explain when the beliefs change, and
more importantly why they change when they do; much of the intuition behind
doxastic continuity is the sense that such an explanation, if not inexistent, is not
forthcoming.
This is an “immediate” cost of taking the defence of the equilibrium con-
ception of belief, and the IDCA thesis, and abandoning the principle of constant
doxastic rest. However, anything close to a complete picture of the cost of this
move cannot be had without considering what stories could be told about why the
principle is to be abandoned. A defender of IDCA cannot simply content himself
with the assertion that beliefs may change in the absence of perturbation. And not
only because of the immediate counter-intuitiveness of this contention. It calls
for a revolution in the modelisation and theorisation of belief and belief change.
To gauge exactly how revolutionary it is, to get a glimpse of how much has to be
overhauled in current theories, it is necessary to consider what the new sorts of
models which do not satisfy constant doxastic rest would look like. To do this,
one needs to consider why it could be that doxastic states, left on their own, might
“automatically” change. Perhaps the least unnatural story which could be given to
explain such changes (we consider another option in the next section) is that the
agent had already committed himself to the change; the change was automatic,
because it was planned.
Consider example 2. again, and suppose that we wish to analyse it as involving
a change of belief which had already occurred when Tom is reminded of the dis-
ease. Then we require that Tom has a doxastic commitment at time t that the drug
Z has good chances of cure, whilst he does not have this commitment at time t+2,
in the absence any new relevant information in the intervening period. Tom’s was
a belief with a best before date; perhaps the most natural way of understanding it
is as having been conceived as such. That is, by considering that Tom was com-
mitted, at time t, to not holding the belief at t+2 that the drug Z has good chances
of cure, in the absence of new relevant information in the intervening period. This
would explain why there was a change in beliefs “before” Tom became aware of
the issue: he was always committed to the change, so it “happened” before the
change in awareness. However, the commitment, at t, to not holding a belief at
t + 2, in the absence of appropriate information in the intervening period, is not a
belief in itself, but rather a commitment to believe. This proposal involves some-
thing which is alien to current models of belief: commitments at one moment to
hold certain beliefs at another moment.
Example 3. can be analysed in a similar way. Rich holds certain doxastic
commitments (about the size of the hole in the ozone layer in December 2009) at
one moment, which he ceases to hold at another moment. There is no perturbation
(new information, discovery of an anomaly etc.) which triggers the retraction of
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his belief; rather, he suspends the belief because he knows that there are more
reliable methods of deciding the issue than those he used (namely, prediction).
Moreover, it was known to Rich when he made his prediction in 2008 that, in
the absence of the relevant data or other pertinent information, he could rationally
suspend judgement on the issue in January 2010. So, the most natural way of
accounting for the change in belief, if one is intent on insisting that it occurred
before his change of awareness, is to postulate that he was committed, in 2008, to
suspending his belief in 2010, in absence of new relevant information.
Under this analysis, Tom’s and Rich’s doxastic states involve something of the
order of a doxastic plan – believe that X holds until moment t, then suspend belief
about X – which they are committed to following unless it is overridden by new
information or some other perturbation. However, doxastic plans, and the com-
mitments at one moment to believe at another which they involve, are strangers
to current models of doxastic states, because they involve irreducable reference to
beliefs at times other than the present. That is, they violate the following widely
if implicitly accepted principle:
(Doxastic actualism) An agent’s doxastic state at time t consists solely in the
beliefs he has at t.
Taken in tandem with the idea that one is interested not in the beliefs the agent
recognises himself as having, but rather in his doxastic commitments, doxastic
actualism states that all there is to say about an agent’s doxastic state at time t is
contained in what can be said about the doxastic commitments he holds at t. It
is evident that the major models of doxastic states satisfy doxastic actualism: the
doxastic state at t is represented by a set of sentences – those believed at t – or
a probability function over those sentences – giving the degrees of belief of the
agent at t – or more sophisticated versions of similar ideas.
Of course, doxastic actualism does not imply that the contents of beliefs can-
not refer to times other than the present. John can believe today that it will rain
tomorrow: the fact that the object of the belief refers to another time does not
change the fact that this belief is only relevant for his doxastic state today. Nor
does it rule out beliefs about beliefs one did or will have at other times: one’s cur-
rentbeliefsaboutwhatonewillbelievetomorrowordidbelieveyesterdaycountas
current beliefs, for it is the object of the belief, not the belief itself, which refers to
another moment of time. Moreover, doxastic actualism does not prohibit the agent
from having commitments about beliefs at other moments, but it insists that these
must follow entirely from his current beliefs. So, for example, present conditional
beliefs, taken in tandem with appropriate rules of update, may generate commit-
ments to believe at other moments; if one currently holds a conditional belief in
a particular hypothesis given certain evidence, then one has the commitment to
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believe the hypothesis at some moment in the future, if one acquires the evidence
at that moment. Since such commitments to believe are derived from present (typ-
ically conditional) beliefs, they are entirely compatible with doxastic actualism.
Doxastic actualism is only violated when there is speciﬁc and irreducible refer-
ence in the actual doxastic state to one’s beliefs or doxastic commitments at times
other than the present. This is exactly what happens in cases of commitments to
believe or suspend belief at other moments that are not derivable from present be-
liefs, as is the case in the examples given above. In example 3., it is not that Rich
does not believe, in 2008, that the hole in the ozone layer would be as predicted,
given that it is January 2010; rather, he plans to suspend the current belief in Jan-
uary 2010. In example 2., Tom does not initially believe that it is not the case that,
if he does not receive any information on the subject for two years, then the drug
will have good chances of cure, nor does he not believe it to have good chances of
cure, given that he does not receive any relevant information for two years; rather,
he is committed to suspending his belief about the drug within two years, unless
he receives new relevant information in the interim.
In summary, doxastic plans, involving commitments to believe or suspend be-
lief at moments other than the present, are one way to explain how it could be
that doxastic commitments change in the absence of perturbation. The key move
is to replace actualistic doxastic states – where all there is to a doxastic state at
a moment is the beliefs held at that moment – with non-actualistic ones – which
may involve commitments to believe or suspend beliefs at other moments. The
principle of constant doxastic rest is violated because the standard notion of dox-
astic state is too restrictive: although the beliefs may change in time without there
being any perturbing inﬂuence, the doxastic plans remain constant in the absence
of perturbation.
This is perhaps the best shot one can give at motivating violations of constant
doxastic rest. Under it, IDCA and the equilibrium conception can be retained at
the price of doxastic actualism; but the costs of dropping this principle are far
from slight. A whole new dimension, that of time, needs to be added to belief
models; notions of consistent doxastic states will have to be reﬁned accordingly.
A new theory of belief formation and belief change is required: it needs to ex-
plain, in particular, on what basis new information, which is typically taken to
affect current beliefs, can also allow one to judge one doxastic plan to be more
appropriate that another which agrees with it on current beliefs. Moreover, aban-
doning doxastic actualism is not philosophically uncontroversial. Is it necessarily
a reasonable normative constraint on rational agents that they not only keep a con-
sistent deﬁnite set of beliefs at each moment, but also a consistent deﬁnite set of
doxastic plans? We conclude that, whilst it is certainly not impossible to defend
IDCA from the examples given above, the cost is signiﬁcant, requiring as it does
a major revision of the sorts of models of doxastic states proposed to date.
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4 Forgoing IDCA
In the previous section, we have considered the price of defending IDCA; this in-
volved, inparticular, consideringhowitcouldbethatone’sbeliefscouldchangein
the absence of perturbation. Now we consider the other side of the dilemma: that
of giving up IDCA. If there are prima facie good reasons for thinking that IDCA
is violated in a certain situations, then a defender of the thesis will, above and
beyond having to wrestle with the consequences detailed in the previous section,
have to show what is wrong with these arguments. Hence the following question:
why do or would doxastic commitments change on merely becoming aware of an
issue?
Consider once again the examples given in Section 2, and suppose that one
accepts the analysis according to which IDCA is violated. In example 3., why
does Rich change his belief on becoming aware of the question of the size of the
hole in the ozone layer? One strong intuition is that he is re-evaluating his old
belief concerning the size of the hole, and on so doing, ﬁnds that the belief now
has insufﬁcient warrant. Re-evaluation of existing beliefs (in particular beliefs
formed at previous moments) is, as we shall see, one possible explanation for why
doxastic commitments may change on mere changes in awareness.
First of all, it is crucial to note that the act of belief re-evaluation is a bona
ﬁde species of change in doxastic commitments. In the examples, there is nothing
contradictory in the agents retaining their existing beliefs and not carrying out the
speciﬁed belief changes. Although in many cases, on re-evaluating one’s beliefs,
the trigger and the motor for the re-evaluation may be deductive – identiﬁcation
and resolution of an inconsistency in one’s beliefs – this is not always the case; it
is not the case in the examples given above. Hence, even if one admits a consis-
tent and non-empty notion of cognitive equilibrium, re-evaluation of beliefs is not
something which is necessarily already “taken into account” in the shift from the
“real” state of belief and awareness to the cognitive equilibrium. In 2008, whilst
aware of the issue, Rich held the doxastic commitment that the ozone hole was
of size W at the end of 2009; in 2010, he was aware of the issue but no longer
held this doxastic commitment: this is a change in his cognitive equilibrium, not
a shift from a non-equilibrium state to an equilibrium one. Therefore, even for the
epistemologist who wishes to trade only in cognitive equilibria and to ignore the
“imperfections”of“real”beliefstates, re-evaluationisabonaﬁdespeciesofbelief
change. Needless to say, re-evaluation may be a rational way of changing beliefs,
in appropriate situations, and so is of potential interest to an epistemologist.
Furthermore, re-evaluation is a species of change which has been largely if
not completely ignored in the literature. The sorts of belief change present in the
examples above are contractions (suspensions of belief), but they do not seem to
fall into any of the categories of contractions identiﬁed to date. As already empha-
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sised, they are not contractions in the face of inconsistency (what Levi (1991) calls
‘coerced contractions’), but they do not fall under the only other sorts of contrac-
tion which have been identiﬁed, namely contractions in the face of anomalies and
in order to accommodate newly proposed theories or hypotheses (the only sorts
of ‘uncoerced contraction’ identiﬁed by Levi (1991, §4.9)). For these latter sorts
of contraction always have some sort of “external informational trigger”, be it the
discovery of an anomaly or the introduction of a new theory or hypothesis. No
such thing is present in the current examples; only the awareness of the issue has
changed. In fact, this difference may point to the reason why re-evaluations have
been widely disregarded to date. In the Peircian perspective, which is highly inﬂu-
ential if not dominant, the problem is to justify changes in belief. Standardly, this
justiﬁcation passes by some sort of trigger, be it incoming new information, in-
troduction of a new theory, discovery of an anomaly or contradiction; these corre-
spond to the perturbations that we met in Section 2. It is natural that re-evaluation
be ignored by those working in this perspective if no answer is forthcoming to the
question: what is the trigger for re-evaluation of beliefs? However, this question
need not go unanswered.
Note ﬁrst of all that, typically, the identiﬁcation of a trigger for a belief change
not only provides a justiﬁcation for the change, but it also ﬁxes the timing of the
change. On learning new information, the agent is not only justiﬁed in altering
his beliefs in the light of the information, but he is also justiﬁed in altering those
beliefs at the moment when the new information arrives, or as soon after it as pos-
sible. That the question of the trigger for a belief change and that of the timing of
the change are related is, of course, completely natural: it is a reasonable principle
that one should undertake a belief change at the ﬁrst available opportunity and in
all the standard cases cited above, this is upon the arrival of the trigger for the
change.
In the light of this relationship between the trigger for a change and the timing
of the change, a trigger can be proposed for re-evaluations of belief. For there are
often ﬁrm intuitions concerning the timing of re-evaluations: in certain situations
at least, one should re-evaluate one’s belief at the ﬁrst available opportunity. But,
more often than not, the ﬁrst available opportunity is when one becomes aware
of the issue with which the belief is concerned. In the examples above, Tom and
Rich re-evaluate their beliefs on becoming aware of the issue of the chances of
cure and the hole in the ozone layer; if they had become aware of the respective
issues ten minutes earlier, they would have re-evaluated their beliefs ten minutes
earlier. Given the relationship between the timing of a change and its trigger, we
can conclude that changes in awareness are potential triggers for re-evaluation.
Theideathatachangeinawarenessmaybeatriggerfortheactofre-evaluation
of one’s beliefs sheds light on the question of why the thesis of independence of
doxastic commitments with respect to awareness may be violated: one case of
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violation is when the change of awareness triggers a re-evaluation which leads to
a change in belief. It explains moreover why re-evaluation of beliefs have been
ignored for so long: one major trigger for these sorts of changes has been “dis-
qualiﬁed” from consideration by the equilibrium conception argument for ignor-
ing awareness. We conclude that there is good reason for abandoning the thesis
of independence of doxastic commitments with respect to awareness, on the basis
of the recognition of a species of belief change – re-evaluation – which may be
triggered by changes of awareness. And the principle of constant doxastic rest is
preserved, once this as yet unconsidered sort of perturbation is taken into account.
Let us stress that it is not being suggested that changes in awareness are all
there is to say about when one should re-evaluate; it sufﬁces for our purposes that
changes of awareness play an integral part in some triggering of re-evaluations of
beliefs. A full discussion of the appropriate circumstances for belief re-evaluation,
not to mention of how beliefs are to be re-evaluated, is beyond the scope of this
paper. Our only contention is that, though a full speciﬁcation of the circumstances
will doubtless be more intricate than the simple remarks made above, change in
awareness will play a role. So, for example, one suggestion is that certain cat-
egories of beliefs should be re-evaluated at the ﬁrst available opportunity after a
sufﬁciently long period of not being explicitly used or having received explicit
attention; of course, this boils down to re-evaluating the beliefs in these categories
on becoming aware of them after an appropriate period of unawareness.
Introduction of the act of re-evaluation of beliefs thus allows one to sanction
changes in doxastic commitments which occur at moments of awareness change,
and retain the principle that in the absence of perturbation (which may include
changes in awareness), beliefs remain constant. It gives a principled reason, ac-
ceptable even to an epistemologist concerned only with doxastic commitments
and not with the “imperfections” of “real” belief states, for thinking that IDCA
may not hold in general. Moreover, it gives an idea of what a theory that does
not espouse IDCA would look like. Above and beyond involving awareness in
the model of doxastic states and in considerations of change of doxastic states,
it would include an act of re-evaluation of beliefs, which could be triggered by
changes of awareness, under suitable conditions.7 Some important steps in the di-
rection of such a theory have already been taken, with the development of models
of awareness and of changes involving awareness (see Fagin and Halpern (1988);
Heifetz et al. (2006); Hill (2008, 2010) for some examples); other elements, such
as the conditions for re-evaluation, remain to be explored. In the light of this,
the project of developing a full theory of belief and belief change which does not
rely on IDCA and which is of epistemological interest, does not seem, neither
7Formally speaking, modelling such an act need not require more than the standard tools al-
ready developed by theories of belief revision and awareness change.
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philosophically nor technically, as daunting as might have been ﬁrst imagined.
Certainly, it is not clear that this road out of the dilemma posed by the examples
above is more difﬁcult than the alternative considered in the previous section.
Beforeclosing, letusnotethattheintroductionoftheoperationofre-evaluation
of beliefs does not lead inevitably to the rejection of IDCA and the preservation
of constant doxastic rest. This depends rather on the answer one gives to the ques-
tion: when should one re-evaluate beliefs? The answer given above – on the ﬁrst
available opportunity under certain conditions, and thus in particular on certain
instances when one becomes aware of the belief – leads to the violation of IDCA,
but the preservation of constant doxastic rest. However, another answer can be
given to the question, with opposite consequences: beliefs should be re-evaluated
at every moment.
This answer provides a different analysis of the examples in Section 2. In
Example 2., it is not that Tom re-evaluates his belief about the chances of cure
on becoming aware of the issue; rather, he has already changed his belief, fol-
lowing a re-evaluation at some previous moment. By maintaining that beliefs are
continually re-evaluated, one can avoid the conclusion that IDCA is violated in
these examples, because the beliefs in question had already changed before the
awareness change. However, these previous re-evaluations must have occurred at
moments when the agent was unaware of the belief which was being re-evaluated.
So this position amounts to the automatic re-evaluation of beliefs, at every mo-
ment, including moments of unawareness of the beliefs being re-evaluated. As
such, it violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the principle of constant doxastic
rest. This principle supposes a meaningful state of doxastic rest, where there is
no perturbation, and demands that in such cases beliefs remain constant. The
thesis of continual re-evaluation either violates the letter of this principle – if the
omnipresent re-evaluations are not understood to be perturbations, then beliefs
can change in a vacuum, in the process of continual re-evaluation – or it violates
the spirit of the principle – if the re-evaluations are considered as perturbations,
then by the thesis of continual re-evaluation, doxastic states are never left un-
perturbed (not even in principle). By maintaining that all beliefs are or should
be re-evaluated at every moment, one escapes the conclusion that IDCA is to be
rejected, and relinquishes instead the principle of constant doxastic rest.
The proposal of continual re-evaluation suffers from several of the disadvan-
tages identiﬁed in the previous section with positions which abandon constant
doxastic rest. In endorsing such a position, one will have to decide between re-
jecting the principle of doxastic continuity or abandoning the notion of full belief.
Formal models which incorporate the position would resemble in many ways the
models which abandon doxastic actualism, and would require a similar overhaul.
In both cases, some theory would be required of how and when beliefs change
“automatically” in the absence of standard perturbing inﬂuences: in the previous
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case, these changes are understood to be the result of prior planning, whereas
under the current proposal, they would be carried out automatically.8
But it is philosophically that the proposal of continual re-evaluation is most
controversial. Why should an “ideal”, fully rational agent re-evaluate all of his
beliefs at every moment? Isn’t this too much to ask for, even of him? Such
a philosophical position can doubtless be defended; in doing so, one effectively
abandonsthePeircianperspectiveaccordingtowhichitischangesofbelief, rather
than beliefs themselves, which are the main objects of attention and of justiﬁca-
tion. Re-evaluating one’s beliefs at every moment is tantamount to “re-justifying”
them continually, and this ﬂies in the face of the Peircian tradition. Indeed, under
the thesis of continual re-evaluation, the classical problem of belief change is of
minimal importance, becoming a simple corollary of the theory of re-evaluation
(at appropriate moments, on re-evaluation, one may ﬁnd that new information has
arrived since the re-evaluation a second before). The argument in this paper has
been to point out some tensions between the sidelining of the notion of awareness
and the understanding of changes of belief. Of course, this argument loses its bite
if the question of belief change is effectively relegated; this is basically what hap-
pens if one maintains the thesis of continual re-evaluation. In this case, the issue
becomes much deeper, involving as it does basic questions concerning the scope
and goal of epistemology. It thus sufﬁces to note that for any epistemologist who
desires to retain some aspects of the Peircian perspective and the importance of
belief change, the continual re-evaluation option is a very difﬁcult road indeed.
In terms of cost, it does not fair better than the rejection of doxastic actualism
considered in Section 3.
5 Conclusion
Themodelsofdoxasticstateswhicharewidelyusedtodayinformalepistemology
to analyse attitude change and decision are relatively simple and attractive. The
purpose of this paper is to highlight the price paid for this simplicity.
In particular, it is commonly assumed that, since these models concern equi-
librium states of belief, the question of awareness can be ignored. The examples
above give reason to reﬂect upon the wisdom of this methodological choice. They
involve cases where pure changes of awareness appear to lead, in a not unrea-
sonable way, to changes in doxastic commitments. The only way of escaping
from this conclusion leads one to give up another fundamental assumption of the
8Indeed, to the extent that the reasons for revising a belief on re-evaluation can be foreseen,
the change can be planned at the outset; hence there may be signiﬁcant similarities between the
theories developed under the two proposals.
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models: namely, that in the absence of perturbation, one’s doxastic state remains
constant.
The examples leave defenders, and users, of these models with a dilemma.
If they wish to retain the equilibrium conception of belief, and the associated
argument for ignoring awareness, then they must abnegate the principle that at
rest, doxastic states remain constant. Beyond the inconvenience of rejecting an
intuitively attractive principle, this option implies considerable philosophical and
technical sacriﬁce: the notion of full belief may have to be abandoned, and, under
the most natural explanation of why doxastic states are not constant at rest, a
fundamental principle underlying all major models of beliefs – that all that is
relevant to one’s current doxastic state are one’s current doxastic commitments –
must abandoned.
On the other hand, if they wish to avoid these sacriﬁces, they must accept
that awareness changes may induce changes in doxastic commitments, and bring
awareness into the modelling of doxastic states, with appropriate reﬁnement, if
not rejection, of the equilibrium conception. However, once one recognises the
sui generis act of re-evaluation of beliefs, there may be epistemologically valid
reasons for thinking that doxastic commitments may sometimes change on mere
changes in awareness; consequently, a epistemologically relevant theory of belief
in which awareness plays a role can be envisaged.
Inconclusion, ignoringawarenessisnotasstraightforwardasitatﬁrstseemed.
Not only may there be good epistemological reasons for taking it into account,
but the dismissal of awareness does not come for free: it in itself entails other
modiﬁcations of standard models of belief.
References
Aumann, R. J. (1976). Agreeing to disagree. The Annals of Statistics, 4:1236–
1239.
Bradley, R. (2007). The kinematics of belief and desire. Synthese, 56:513–535.
Dekel, E., Lipman, B. L., and Rustichini, A. (1998). Standard state-space models
preclude unawareness. Econometrica, 66:159–173.
Fagin, R. and Halpern, J. Y. (1988). Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning.
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 34:39–76.
Gärdenfors, P. (1988). Knowledge in Flux : Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic
States. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
21Brian Hill Awareness and Equilibrium
Halpern, J. Y. and Rêgo, L. C. (2007). Generalized Solution Concepts in Games
with Possibly Unaware Players. In Proceedings of the Eleventh Conference on
Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, pages 253–262.
Heifetz, A., Meier, M., and Schipper, B. (2006). Interactive unawareness. J. Econ.
Theory, 130:78–94.
Hill, B. (2008). Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II:
Belief Revision. Studia Logica, 89(3):291–323.
Hill, B. (2010). Awareness dynamics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 39:113–
137.
Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the
Two Notions. College Publications, London. New Edition, 2005.
Jeffrey, R. C. (1972). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 2nd edition.
Levi, I. (1980). The Enterprise of Knowledge. An Essay on Knowledge, Credal
Probability and Chance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Levi, I. (1991). The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing. Changing Beliefs through
Inquiry. CUP, Cambridge.
Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Truth and probability. In The Foundations of Mathematics
and Other Logical Essays. Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York.
Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Dover, New York. 2nd edn
1971.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1984). Inquiry. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
22